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ENRON, SARBANES-OXLEY AND ACCOUNTING: RULES VERSUS
PRINCIPLES VERSUS RENTS
WILLIAM W. BRATTON*
THE stock market awakened in 2002 to discover that it no longer hadnumbers it could trust.1  Securities issuers, oriented toward share-
holder value enhancement by the corporate culture of the 1990s, had
been adopting aggressive, even fraudulent treatments to enhance re-
ported earnings, and their auditors had been doing nothing to stop them.
So long as the money kept falling out of the sky during the bull market,
nobody worried about the diminishing independence of auditors.  But
what was ignored before 2001 triggered a crisis in 2002 in markets already
reeling on economic fundamentals.  As the audit failures piled up on one
another, investors lost confidence in managers, market intermediaries and
auditors alike.2
* Samuel Tyler Research Professor of Law, The George Washington
University Law School.
1. See, e.g., Gretchen Morgenson, Worries of More Enrons to Come Give Stock Prices
a Pounding, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 30, 2002, at C1.  For a review of the Enron disaster, see
William W. Bratton, Enron and the Dark Side of Shareholder Value, 76 TUL. L. REV.
1275 (2002).
2. A General Accounting Office report notes that public company restate-
ments rose from 92 in 1997 to 225 in 2001.  From 1997 to June 2002, there were
919 announced restatements, involving 845 companies, which came to ten percent
of all those listed. See FINANCIAL RESTATEMENTS: TRENDS, MARKET IMPACTS, REGULA-
TORY RESPONSES, AND REMAINING CHALLENGES, General Accounting Office Report
to the Chairman, Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs (Oct.
2002) (GAO-03-138), available at http://www.gao.gov [hereinafter GAO REPORT].
The decline in compliance has not been limited to companies subject to en-
forcement actions, like Cendant and Sunbeam. See  In re Cendant Corp. Sec. Li-
tig., 109 F. Supp. 2d 235, 239 (D.N.J. 2000); Chad Terhune & Joanne S. Lublin,
Unlike Others, Dollar General Issues a Mea Culpa, WALL ST. J., Jan. 17, 2002, at B1
(noting Dollar General’s public apology and admission of guilt for its accounting
irregularities in same week that “Chainsaw” Al Dunlop paid $15 million settlement
stemming from Sunbeam’s fraudulent financials).  Investigations and criticisms
touch reputable names like Xerox, Lucent, American International, Coca Cola,
IBM and General Electric itself. See Claudia H. Deutsch & Reed Abelson, Xerox
Facing New Pressures Over Auditing, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 9, 2001, at C1; Jeremy Kahn,
Accounting in Wonderland: Jeremy Kahn Goes Down the Rabbit Hole with G.E.’s Books,
FORTUNE, Mar. 19, 2001, at 37; Steve Liesman, Heard on the Street: Deciphering the
Black Box, WALL ST. J., Jan. 23, 2002, at C1 (noting that, after Enron scandal, inves-
tors will closely scrutinize books and practices of companies like Coca-Cola, GE
and AIG); Simon Romero, Lucent’s Books Said to Draw Attention of the S.E.C., N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 10, 2001, at C1; Rachel Emma Silverman & Ken Brown, Five Companies:
How They Get Their Numbers, WALL ST. J., Jan. 19, 2002, at C1, C16 (noting complex-
ity of major corporations’ books make it almost impossible to accurately assess fi-
nancial status of company).  The number of accounting restatements, when
companies lower previously reported earnings, averaged forty-nine per year from
(1023)
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In our self-regulatory system of corporate law, the job of insisting on
trustworthy numbers devolves in the first instance on the gatekeepers.  It
follows that the auditors take the brunt of the blame and that the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act (the “Act”),3 the legislation intended to address the
scandals and restore confidence in the securities markets, responds by reg-
ulating the accounting profession.  More accurately, Sarbanes-Oxley trig-
gers the start of a political process intended over time to produce a new
regulatory regime.  The statute follows the standard regulatory strategy of
delegating most of the task of devising the new regime’s terms to an ad-
ministrative agency, a new Public Oversight Board (POB).4  The regula-
tory outcome remains open accordingly.  High financial stakes imply an
ongoing political contest over the POB’s political and institutional gestalt
and the terms of any new regulation.  The resulting uncertainty, although
regrettable, probably could not have been avoided.
Unfortunately, Sarbanes-Oxley does not stop with an open-ended del-
egation of authority respecting the audit function to a new agency.  The
Act goes on to address the substance of Generally Accepted Accounting
Principles (GAAP).  It does this first in section 108(d), which requires the
SEC to study the accounting system to ascertain the extent to which it is
“principles-based,” as opposed to “rules-based,” and to tell us how long it
will take for us to achieve a “principles-based” system;5 and second, in sec-
tion 108(a), which requires the Financial Accounting Standards Board
1990 to 1997.  By 2000, the annual number was up to 156. See Liesman, supra, at
C1.
3. See generally Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745
(codified in scattered sections of Titles 11, 15, 18, 28 and 29 U.S.C.).  For a discus-
sion of the meaning of the audit crisis for the legal profession, see Lawrence A.
Cunningham, Sharing Accounting’s Burden: Business Lawyers in Enron’s Dark Shadows,
57 BUS. LAW. 1421 (2002).
4. Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 103(a)(1).  The Act provides:
(1) IN GENERAL.—The Board shall, by rule, establish, including, to the
extent it determines appropriate, through adoption of standards pro-
posed by 1 or more professional groups of accountants . . . or advisory
groups . . ., and amend or otherwise modify or alter, such auditing and
related attestation standards, such quality control standards, and such
ethics standards to be used by registered public accounting firms in the
preparation and issuance of audit reports, as required by this Act or the
rules of the Commission, or as may be necessary or appropriate in the
public interest or for the protection of investors.
Id.
5. Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 108(d) provides in pertinent part:
SEC. 108. ACCOUNTING STANDARDS.
. . .
(d) STUDY AND REPORT ON ADOPTING PRINCIPLES-BASED
ACCOUNTING.—
(1) STUDY.—
(A) IN GENERAL.—The Commission shall conduct a study on the adop-
tion by the United States financial reporting system of a principles-based
accounting system.
(B) STUDY TOPICS.—The study required by subparagraph (A) shall in-
clude an examination of—
2003] ENRON, SARBANES-OXLEY AND ACCOUNTING 1025
(FASB) and any other approved standards-setting body to adopt proce-
dures ensuring prompt consideration of new rules reflecting “interna-
tional convergence on high quality accounting standards.”6  Given an
(i) the extent to which principles-based accounting and financial re-
porting exists in the United States;
(ii) the length of time required for change from a rules-based to a
principles-based financial reporting system;
(iii) the feasibility of and proposed methods by which a principles-
based system may be implemented; and
(iv) a thorough economic analysis of the implementation of a princi-
ples-based system.
(2) REPORT.—Not later than 1 year after the date of enactment of
this Act, the Commission shall submit a report on the results of the study
required by paragraph (1) to the Committee on Banking, Housing, and
Urban Affairs of the Senate and the Committee on Financial Services of
the House of Representatives.
Id.
6. Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 108(a)(2)(b)(1)(A)(v).  Section 108(a)  provides in
pertinent part:
SEC. 108. ACCOUNTING STANDARDS.
(a) AMENDMENT TO SECURITIES ACT OF 1933—Section 19 of
the Securities Act of 1933 (15 U.S.C. 77s) is amended—
. . .
(2) by inserting after subsection (a) the following:
(b) RECOGNITION OF ACCOUNTING STANDARDS.—
(1) IN GENERAL.—In carrying out its authority . . . the Commission
may recognize, as ‘generally accepted’ for purposes of the securities laws,
any accounting principles established by a standard setting body—
(A) that—
(i) is organized as a private entity;
(ii) has, for administrative and operational purposes, a board of
trustees (or equivalent body) serving in the public interest, the majority
of whom are not, concurrent with their service on such board, and have
not been during the 2-year period preceding such service, associated per-
sons of any registered public accounting firm;
(iii) is funded as provided in section 109 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act
of 2002;
(iv) has adopted procedures to ensure prompt consideration, by ma-
jority vote of its members, of changes to accounting principles necessary
to reflect emerging accounting issues and changing business practices;
and
(v) considers, in adopting accounting principles, the need to keep
standards current in order to reflect changes in the business environ-
ment, the extent to which international convergence on high quality ac-
counting standards is necessary or appropriate in the public interest and
for the protection of investors; and
(B) that the Commission determines has the capacity to assist the
Commission in fulfilling the requirements of subsection (a) and section
13(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 [15 U.S.C.A. 78m], because,
at a minimum, the standard setting body is capable of improving the ac-
curacy and effectiveness of financial reporting and the protection of in-
vestors under the securities laws.
(2) ANNUAL REPORT.—A standard setting body described in para-
graph (1) shall submit an annual report to the Commission and the pub-
lic, containing audited financial statements of that standard setting body.”.
Id.
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ongoing political contest respecting the shape of the POB and its regula-
tory program, critical questions need to be asked about these substantive
initiatives.
More particularly, this Article asks whether substantive intervention
into the articulation of GAAP could trigger just the sort of regulatory error
that the agency delegation model, followed in respect of the POB, was
intended to avoid.  “Principles-based accounting” and “international con-
vergence,” however desirable in the abstract, have to be considered in
light of the institutional contexts in which they would operate and effect
consequences.  “Principles” and “convergence,” by themselves do little to
constrain rent-seeking behavior on the part of managers and auditors.  Ab-
sent antecedent institutional reform that ensures auditor independence
and lessens the negative impact of rent-seeking and influence activity on
audit quality, perverse effects could follow in the event that sections
108(d) and 108(a) influence GAAP’s future shape.7  Unfortunately,
Sarbanes-Oxley does not ensure the requisite institutional reform; it
merely holds out the possibility of reform.
Part I describes Sarbanes-Oxley’s delegation to the POB, surveying
the issues the Act leaves open and the ongoing political contest respecting
their resolution.8  Part II situates the principles-based accounting that the
Act commends in the context of the Enron disaster.9  This discussion be-
gins with a story currently in circulation—that Enron exemplifies the
abuses of rules-based accounting under GAAP and demonstrates the need
to move to principles-based accounting.  The discussion then falsifies the
story, showing that Enron violated both rules and standards under GAAP.
Full responsibility for the disaster goes to the enforcement of GAAP’s rules
and standards by Enron’s auditor rather than to the rules and standards
themselves.  The discussion then broadens, explaining why the relative
merits of rules and principles are being debated in respect of GAAP at this
time, and how the principles-based argument rests on a false premise,
holding out risks for audit quality.
I. THE DELEGATION GAMBLE
The drafters of Sarbanes-Oxley could not reasonably have been ex-
pected to produce an exhaustive new scheme of regulation for the ac-
counting profession.  With accounting, as with all professions, information
asymmetries between insiders and outsiders make regulation difficult.
The problems for solution—inappropriate and aggressive treatments, au-
ditor independence and audit quality—do not lend themselves to ex ante
7. Section 108(d) already has forced FASB to take steps toward a more princi-
ples-based regime. See FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BOARD, PRINCIPLES-
BASED APPROACH TO U.S. STANDARD SETTING, No. 1125-001 (October 21, 2002)
[hereinafter FASB, PRINCIPLES APPROACH].
8. See infra notes 13-46 and accompanying text.
9. See infra notes 47-110 and accompanying text.
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treatment by an exhaustive and self-executory set of legislative directions.
The time-honored strategy of delegating open-ended legislative and adju-
dicatory authority to an agency works better; here, the new agency com-
bines a regulator with a professional disciplinary board.  The new agency
can be staffed with insider experts, who can then tailor regulations to par-
ticular facts and circumstances and deal case by case with those who com-
mit professional misconduct.  Sarbanes-Oxley proceeds on these
assumptions, vesting a wide range of regulatory authority in the new POB.
Under section 101(c), the POB is to “establish or adopt, or both, by rule,
auditing, quality-control, ethics, independence, and other standards relat-
ing to the preparation of audit reports;”10 to “conduct inspections of regis-
tered public accounting firms;”11 and to conduct “disciplinary
proceedings” in respect of firms and their personnel.12  The new regime’s
substantive content, like the investigations themselves, is to be left over to
the POB, subject to the ultimate supervision of the Securities and Ex-
change Commission (SEC).13
Sarbanes-Oxley “hard wires” some incidental regulations, directing
the POB to promulgate specific rules respecting matters such as retention
of audit records, audit partner review and auditor review of internal con-
trols.14  But, for the most part, the Act contains very little direct regulation
of accounting treatments and audit practice.  Indeed, the more controver-
sial the subject matter, the more hesitant the drafters of Sarbanes-Oxley
became.  On a number of key topics, the Act avoids prohibiting, directing
or even delegating, preferring to order up studies from third party agen-
cies.15  The drafters in effect look to the standard playbook of an outside
director facing an adverse development, but articulating no coherent re-
sponse and possessing no pertinent expertise.  For example, the Act or-
ders a Comptroller General study of audit firm rotation,16 where the Act
actually mandates the lesser palliative of audit partner rotation.17  The
Comptroller General also is directed to study auditor consolidation and
concentration, and to look into concentration’s effect on audits and inde-
pendence in so doing.18
10. Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 101(c)(2).
11. Id. § 101(c)(3).
12. Id. § 101(c)(4).
13. The regulatory model tracks that of the securities trading organizations,
like the New York Stock Exchange and the National Association of Securities Deal-
ers. See id. § 107(a).
14. See id. § 103(a)(2).
15. The drafters in effect looked to the outside director’s standard expedient
of employing an expert and ordering a study given an adverse development, no
pertinent expertise and no coherent response.
16. Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 207.
17. Id. § 203.
18. See id. § 701. The provision provides as follows:
SEC. 701. GAO STUDY AND REPORT REGARDING CONSOLIDATION
OF PUBLIC ACCOUNTING FIRMS.
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Surprisingly, audit practice itself is not included on Sarbanes-Oxley’s
list of studies.  If the Act’s drafters had been serious about gauging the
scope of the problem and getting to the roots of the crisis, one would have
expected them to direct a study of prevailing audit practice and its connec-
tion to recent audit failures.  Audit firm concentration, although also an
important topic, only approaches by indirection the critical questions con-
cerning audit quality and auditor incentives.  Before considering the
counterfactual question of how a world with, say, fifteen large audit firms
would differ from the world of the Final Four firms, one needs to know
just how low the standard of audit practice has sunk.  Whatever the ideal
number of large firms, we need findings respecting the degree of noncom-
pliance with GAAP customarily tolerated by audit partners and the prac-
tices and concepts on which the accounting profession draws on in its
internal discussions when it sanctions departures from GAAP.
(a) STUDY REQUIRED.—The Comptroller General of the United
States shall conduct a study—
(1) to identify—
(A) the factors that have led to the consolidation of public account-
ing firms since 1989 and the consequent reduction in the number of
firms capable of providing audit services to large national and multi-na-
tional business organizations that are subject to the securities laws;
(B) the present and future impact of the condition described in sub-
paragraph (A) on capital formation and securities markets, both domes-
tic and international; and
(C) solutions to any problems identified under subparagraph (B),
including ways to increase competition and the number of firms capable
of providing audit services to large national and multinational business
organizations that are subject to the securities laws;
(2) of the problems, if any, faced by business organizations that have
resulted from limited competition among public accounting firms, in-
cluding—
(A) higher costs;
(B) lower quality of services;
(C) impairment of auditor independence; or
(D) lack of choice; and
(3) whether and to what extent Federal or State regulations impede
competition among public accounting firms.
(b) CONSULTATION.—In planning and conducting the study
under this section, the Comptroller General shall consult with—
(1) the Commission;
(2) the regulatory agencies that perform functions similar to the
Commission within the other member countries of the Group of Seven
Industrialized Nations;
(3) the Department of Justice; and
(4) any other public or private sector organization that the Comp-
troller General considers appropriate.
(c) REPORT REQUIRED.—Not later than 1 year after the date of
enactment of this Act, the Comptroller General shall submit a report on
the results of the study required by this section to the Committee on
Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs of the Senate and the Committee
on Financial Services of the House of Representatives.
Id.
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One could draw a negative inference at this point and infer that the
omission reflects the drafters’ preference for actions that create an appear-
ance of corrective activity without actually promising to achieve correc-
tion.  A possible correction that might follow, for example, if the Act were
to cause the harsh light of publicity to be cast on day-to-day audit practice
at the Final Four audit firms.  A glimpse of a sordid reality, thus engi-
neered, might trigger pressure for a more intense reform program—a
program outside the box of reform contemplated by the political settle-
ment from which Sarbanes-Oxley’s drafters took their directions.
Whatever the results of the study of industry concentration, it seems un-
likely that Congress will respond by busting up the Final Four firms.
The agency delegation model suggests a less malignant explanation,
however.  The Act mandates no direct investigation of audit practice be-
cause the subject matter lies in the POB’s future zone of responsibility.  If
the POB needs to do extensive fact finding as it goes about articulating
quality control standards19 and conducting inspections20 of audit firms, it
has the authority to do so.
The problem lies not in the agency authorization but in the future
execution.  As the Act delegates more and more to a new agency, the regu-
latory outcome is placed more and more at risk.  To see the high degree of
reliance the Act places on the agency it creates, consider its provision on
consulting arrangements between auditors and their clients.21  This inter-
vention bears directly on the crisis of confidence.  Historically, the ac-
counting firms’ interest in maintaining reputations for proper
performance, coupled with a backstop threat of legal liability, imported a
needed adverseness to the auditor-client relationship.22  In the 1990s,
however, two factors changed.  First, the liability system was adjusted to
make accounting firms less susceptible to liability to private plaintiffs.23
Second, by 2000 the Big Five firms’ revenues for non-audit or “manage-
ment advisory” services grew to fifty percent of total revenues, where
twenty years earlier they had constituted only thirteen percent of total rev-
19. See id. § 103(a)(1).
20. See id. § 104(a).
21. See id. § 103(a)(2)(B)(ii).
22. Or at least a degree of adverseness more intense than that prevailing in
the 1990s.  For the view that the incentive-incompatible fact that the client’s man-
agers pay the fee assures the persistence of independence problems, see Sean M.
O’Connor, The Inevitability of Enron and the Impossibility of “Auditor Independence”
Under the Current Audit System, (SSRN working paper, 2002), available at http://
www.ssrn.com.
23. The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 erects a substantial
pleading barrier to private accountant’s liability. See Section 21(D)(b)(2) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934.  In addition, a line of cases holds that, absent a
direct financial interest in the client, an auditor’s interest in a reputation for hon-
esty and care makes an allegation of scienter implausible. See Melder v. Morris, 27
F.3d 1097, 1103 (5th Cir. 1994); DiLeo v. Ernst & Young, 901 F.2d 624, 629 (7th
Cir. 1990); Retsky Family Ltd. P’ship v. Price Waterhouse LLP, 1998 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 17459, *23-29 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 21, 1998).
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enues.24  The audit firms’ incentive to take positions adverse to their cli-
ents’ with respect to aggressive treatments diminished correspondingly.
Consider, by way of illustration of the problem, that one of the most im-
portant reviews in the audit concerns the client’s internal control and
monitoring systems.  An auditor is hardly likely to question the effective-
ness of a compliance system sold by his or her own firm.  Yet through the
1990s, auditing firms were also routinely selling compliance systems to
their clients—Andersen sold Enron its compliance system in 1993.25
The Enron disaster, with its combination of sham transactions and
antecedent (and lucrative) auditor consultation in the sham transactions’
structure, demonstrated that consulting relationships can indeed contrib-
ute to catastrophic audit failures.26  The governance breakdown in the
case was multifaceted.  It only began with internal compliance systems and
board monitoring at Enron and monitoring by outside actors in the mar-
ketplace.  Just as accounting clients have these internal governance sys-
tems to assure that disasters do not happen, so do audit firms.  Auditing is
such a high-risk business that audit firms have elaborate internal control
and monitoring systems, reviewing their own performance to a degree un-
known in law firms.27  Yet the Enron disaster occurred despite this second
level compliance system—Andersen’s head office passed on the shams be-
cause it projected growing revenues from Enron consulting.28 The multi-
ple compliance systems collapsed under the all powerful, downward
gravitational pull of rents.
Prior to Sarbanes-Oxley and the Enron crack up, pursuant to a rule
promulgated in 2000, the SEC prohibited auditors from providing a list of
services, including bookkeeping, financial information systems design, ap-
praisal or valuation services, actuarial services, fairness opinions, manage-
ment functions and financial implementation systems design and
implementation.29  The Act’s section 201 follows up after the fact with the
following provision:
[I]t shall be unlawful for a . . . public accounting firm . . . that
performs for any issuer any audit . . .  to provide to that issuer,
contemporaneously with the audit, any non-audit service, includ-
ing—
24. See John C. Coffee, Jr., The Acquiescent Gatekeeper: Reputational Intermediaries,
Auditor Independence, and the Governance of Accounting, Columbia Law School Center
for Law and Economic Studies Working Paper No. 191 (2001), at 27.
25. See Thaddeus Herrick & Alexei Barrionuevo, Were Auditor and Client Too
Close-Knit?, WALL ST. J., Jan. 21, 2002, at C1.
26. See Bratton, supra note 1, at 1348-51.
27. See John C. Coffee, Jr., Understanding Enron: “It’s About the Gatekeepers, Stu-
pid”, 57 BUS. LAW. 1403, 1415 (2002).
28. See Internal Arthur Andersen Memorandum, from Michael D. Jones to
David B. Duncan (Feb. 6, 2001) (on file with author).
29. See Revision of the Commission’s Auditor Independence Requirements,
65 Fed. Reg. 76,008-01 (2000) (codified at 17 C.F.R. §§ 210.2-01, 240.14e-101).
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(1) bookkeeping or other services related to the accounting
records or financial statements of the audit client;
(2) financial information systems design and
implementation;
(3) appraisal or valuation services, fairness opinions, or con-
tribution-in-kind reports;
(4) actuarial services;
(5) internal audit outsourcing services;
(6) management functions or human resources;
(7) broker or dealer, investment adviser, or investment
banking services;
(8) legal services and expert services unrelated to the audit;
and
(9) any other service that the Board determines, by regula-
tion, is impermissible.30
The provision has been said to impose an absolute bar on consulting.31
Yet the reader comparing it to the list in the SEC regulation sees at once
that the Act only carries over the antecedent, partial list.32  The Act does
imply an advance on the previous regulation in the form of an absolute
bar when it introduces the list with the phrase, “any non-audit service in-
cluding.”  This suggests that the list is for illustration only and that the
controlling concept is “any non-audit service,” which would be prohibited
whatever its nature.  But that reading is undercut when the list ends with
the item, “any other service that the Board determines, by regulation, is
impermissible.”  This implies that services not on the list are permitted
until such time as the POB gets around to extending the prohibition.
On its face, then, section 201 raises an issue of statutory interpreta-
tion: Whether it flatly bars non-audit services or merely offers a now-you-
see-it-now-you-don’t perpetuation of the regulatory status quo.  The latter
reading makes perfect sense in the overall context of the legislation, even
as it appears to undercut its reformatory mission.  Under the latter read-
ing, the Act effects no substantial present changes, instead delegating to
the POB authority to effect change in the future.  The reading brings sec-
30. Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 201(a) (2002) (amending Section 10A of the Securi-
ties Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1).  The section goes on to require
preapproval by the audit committee for non-audit services. See id. § 201(h).
31. See Strengthening the Commission’s Requirements Regarding Auditor In-
dependence, Final Rule, Securities Act Release No. 33-8183, Exchange Act Release
No. 34-47265, 65 Fed. Reg. 6005 (Feb. 5, 2003), available at http://www.sec.gov/
rules/proposed/33-8183.htm (finding that subsection (g) of section 201 specifies
several non-audit services that are prohibited).
32. See id. (noting that only perceived difference is that statute makes absolute
bar to information systems design that previously was partial).
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tion 201 into line with the Act’s other key provisions respecting the ac-
counting profession.33
This story of benign delegation has a dark side, however.  Under the
delegation reading, the flow of rents to the Final Four firms continues
unabated for the present.  The matter of future rent constraints is left to
be determined in the context of the emerging relationship between the
POB and the industry.  Should the Final Four firms gain any influence
over the POB, one can expect their number one agenda item to be the
protection of their rents from further restriction.  A lot of money is at
stake, even as the accounting firms loudly divest themselves of consulting
divisions.34  As of the third quarter of 2002, fifty percent of the Final
Four’s revenues still were coming from non-audit services.35  Meanwhile,
the only rents Sarbanes-Oxley actually cuts off are those of corporate man-
agers, who will be required to pay back their bonus payments in the wake
of any accounting restatements.36
Sarbanes-Oxley’s reliance on the delegation model thus raises a politi-
cal question.  The agency delegation model works well only so long as the
agency successfully resists capture by the interests of the actors it regulates.
In the standard picture, capture problems arise over time, as the agency
and the regulated entities deal with one another on a repeated basis.
Early in the agency’s life cycle, immediately following enactment of the
generating statute, its actors maintain an adverse posture, perhaps acti-
vated by an original regulatory vision.  Later on, personal career interests,
interest group influence activities and the cooperative dispositions that ac-
company personal relationships can cause administrators’ motivations to
shift in a more accommodating direction.37  The regulatory mission be-
comes compromised as a result.
To read the cold print of Sarbanes-Oxley is to see no apparent reason
for concern about compromise of the POB’s mission.  The POB will oper-
ate under the supervision of the SEC, and the SEC, whatever mistakes it
33. The SEC reads the statute this way.  New SEC rules, promulgated under
section 201, further elaborate on the items on the list, incrementally extending the
standing services prohibition, without breaking any new ground. See id.
34. See Cassell Bryan-Low, Accounting Firms Are Still Consulting, WALL. ST. J.,
Sept. 23, 2002, at C1, C7.  Current consulting revenues represent a substantial de-
crease: PricewaterhouseCoopers took in $9.16 billion total revenues pre-divestiture
and $5.26 billion post-divestiture; Ernst & Young took in $6.10 billion pre and
$4.49 billion post; Deloitte & Touche took in $6.13 billion pre and $4 billion post;
KPMG took in $5.45 billion pre and $3.42 billion post. See id. (representing post-
divestiture earnings in graph).
35. See id. (“Accounting firms continue to advise on everything from manage-
ment processes to tax-minimization strategies to corporate finance to security of
clients’ computer networks . . . .”).
36. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 304(a).
37. See IAN AYRES & JOHN BRAITHWAITE, RESPONSIVE REGULATION: TRAN-
SCENDING THE DEREGULATION DEBATE 54-56 (1992) (describing circumstances of
business regulation that lead to cooperation, corruption and capture).
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has made in its long history, has never had its independence seriously
questioned.
The prevailing political context nevertheless holds out reasons for
concern.  In this case the political struggle between the public interest and
the interest of the regulated industry has continued unabated in the im-
mediate wake of the statute’s enactment.  The accounting profession has
become famously aggressive at protecting its own interests and those of its
clients in the corridors of power in Washington.  During the 1990s it used
its influence to stifle FASB’s reform initiatives concerning accounting for
stock options and accounting for mergers.38  The industry’s lobbyists pul-
led out the stops again when Arthur Levitt’s SEC suggested that fees from
consulting services were compromising auditor independence.  Although,
as noted above, the SEC did promulgate a new set of independence rules,
those rules embodied a compromise effected after a period of intense po-
litical struggle.39
Enron and other scandals put the accountants and their Washington
representatives more and more on the defensive as 2002 unfolded.
Sarbanes-Oxley represented a strategic defeat for their side.  Even so, the
accountants and their representatives have every reason to fight on.  As we
have seen, the Act delegates the most important matters concerning pro-
fessional standards to the POB.  From a political perspective, those matters
remain contestable.  Enormous rents remain at stake, in respect of both
auditing services and outside consulting.  The political climate remains
volatile, creating openings in which the voice of influence can effectively
be raised.  And even as Sarbanes-Oxley delegates this core subject matter
and contains relatively few significant self-executing rules, it probably still
has more regulatory bite than many of the Congressmen who voted in its
favor really desired.  It was passed by a Congress in haste, frightened of
negative elective consequences stemming from the compounding of the
Enron disaster by the WorldCom accounting scandal (and bankruptcy) of
the summer of 2002.  The Act was signed by a President activated by much
the same political calculation.40  Ordinarily, many of these actors would
have been more accommodating of the interests of the accounting profes-
sion and its clients.41
38. Chairman Arthur Levitt’s memoir provides an excellent summary. See AR-
THUR LEVITT, TAKE ON THE STREET: WHAT WALL STREET AND CORPORATE AMERICA
DON’T WANT YOU TO KNOW, WHAT YOU CAN DO TO FIGHT BACk 109-15 (2002).
39. See id. at 115-39.
40. See Statement by President George W. Bush upon signing H.R. 3763, 38
WKLY. COMP. PRES. DOC. 1286, 1286 (July 30, 2002), available at www.gpoaccess.
gov/executive.html#presidential (“The Act adopts tough new provisions to deter
and punish corporate and accounting fraud and corruption, ensure justice for
wrong doers, and protect the interests of workers and shareholders.”).
41. See Mike McNamee, Will Pitt Pick an Accounting Watchdog Who Can Bite?,
BUS. WK., Sept. 2, 2002, at 47 (commenting that SEC Chairman Harvey Pitt was
under pressure to “touch all the political bases” when picking new candidate to
head POB).  Congressman Michael G. Oxley, the Oxley of Sarbanes-Oxley, went
right to work with the accounting lobby to undercut the POB. See Editorial, Killing
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It comes as no surprise that the accounting profession continued to
contest the substance of the new regime by asking for a POB that would
accommodate its interests.  There resulted, in October and November of
2002, one of the more sordid moments in the whole series of scandals.
Harvey Pitt, the SEC Chairman, nominated William Webster to be the
POB chair.  Webster, a well-known actor on Washington’s regulatory stage,
was thought to bring an accommodating disposition respecting vested in-
terests.  Unfortunately, his cooperative disposition already had manifested
itself in a questionable boardroom judgment.  As a member of an audit
committee, Webster had voted to fire an audit firm that had raised ques-
tions about the propriety of management treatments.  This embarrassing
fact, privately disclosed by Webster to Pitt, was then concealed by Pitt from
other members of the Commission.  Revelation of the nondisclosure trig-
gered a pre-election furor.  Webster resigned from consideration,42 and
Pitt made public his resignation from his post as soon as the polls closed
on election day.43  A substitute nominee was not named for almost six
months.44  That nominee, William J. McDonough, former president of the
Federal Reserve Bank of New York, has a reputation for toughness and
integrity.45  But, because delay has a value, and the nominee has no ties to
the agenda of corporate governance activists, the round must be scored in
the industry’s favor.
The Final Four firms, pressed to protect their franchise and accompa-
nying rents, can be expected to continue this rear guard action.  The final
outcome remains anybody’s guess.  For the present, one can only say that
Sarbanes-Oxley’s regulatory delegation makes possible a meaningful re-
alignment of the auditors’ incentives of auditors without providing a cir-
cumstantial guarantee that the realignment ever actually occurs.46
Reform Behind Closed Doors, BUS. WK., Oct. 21, 2002, at 174 (insinuating that Con-
gressman Oxley’s effort to block appointment of tough reformer John Biggs was
result of lobbyist pressure).
42. See Don A. Moore, An Honest Account, WALL ST. J., Nov. 13, 2002, at A24
(explaining circumstances surrounding William Webster’s resignation).
43. For commentary on these sorry events, see, for example, Jeanne Cum-
mings et al., Rapid Exit: SEC’s Pitt Resigns Amid Controversy Over Webster Job, WALL ST.
J., Nov. 6, 2002, at A4; Robert Kuttner, So Much for Cracking Down on the Accountants,
BUS. WK., Nov. 18, 2002, at 24; Alan Murray, Webster Is Symptom of the Very Disease
He’s Meant to Cure, WALL ST. J., Nov. 12, 2002, at A4; Michael Schroeder, Leading the
News: Webster Makes It Official and Quits Accounting Board, WALL ST. J., Nov. 13, 2002,
at A3.
44. Charles D. Niemeier was named acting chair of the POB in January 2003.
See Cassell Bryan-Low & Michael Schroeder, SEC Names Niemeier Acting Head of Ac-
counting-Oversight Board, WALL ST. J., Jan. 9, 2003, at C10.  The POB’s first official
action was to vote its members a salary of $452,000. See David Rogers, Big Salaries
for Oversight Panel Are Questioned on Capitol Hill, WALL ST. J., Jan. 1, 2003, at A4.
45. See Deborah Solomon & Cassell Bryan-Low, ’Tough’ Cop for Accounting Beat,
WALL ST. J., Apr. 16, 2003, at C1.
46. Congress, having thus delegated the hard questions about auditor inde-
pendence, proceeds in section 301 to place them in the near term into the lap of
the audit committee.  Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 301 provides in part:
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SEC. 301. PUBLIC COMPANY AUDIT COMMITTEES.
Section 10A of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 78f) is
amended by adding at the end the following:
(m) STANDARDS RELATING TO AUDIT COMMITTEES.—
. . .
(2) RESPONSIBILITIES RELATING TO REGISTERED PUBLIC AC-
COUNTING FIRMS.—The audit committee of each issuer, in its capacity
as a committee of the board of directors, shall be directly responsible for
the appointment, compensation, and oversight of the work of any regis-
tered public accounting firm employed by that issuer (including resolu-
tion of disagreements between management and the auditor regarding
financial reporting) for the purpose of preparing or issuing an audit re-
port or related work, and each such registered public accounting firm
shall report directly to the audit committee.
(3) INDEPENDENCE.—
(A) IN GENERAL.—Each member of the audit committee of the
issuer shall be a member of the board of directors of the issuer, and shall
otherwise be independent.
(B) CRITERIA.—In order to be considered to be independent for
purposes of this paragraph, a member of an audit committee of an issuer
may not, other than in his or her capacity as a member of the audit com-
mittee, the board of directors, or any other board committee—
(i) accept any consulting, advisory, or other compensatory fee from
the issuer; or
(ii) be an affiliated person of the issuer or any subsidiary thereof.
. . .
“(5) AUTHORITY TO ENGAGE ADVISERS.—Each audit committee
shall have the authority to engage independent counsel and other advis-
ers, as it determines necessary to carry out its duties.
“(6) FUNDING.—Each issuer shall provide for appropriate funding,
as determined by the audit committee, in its capacity as a committee of
the board of directors, for payment of compensation—
“(A) to the registered public accounting firm employed by the issuer
for the purpose of rendering or issuing an audit report; and
“(B) to any advisers employed by the audit committee under para-
graph (5).”.
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 301, 116 Stat. 745, 775-77.
With these provisions the statute makes a direct contribution to the account-
ing practice.  Two exercises of management’s business judgment lie at the heart of
the auditing problem—its selection of the firm’s accounting treatments and its
selection of the reviewing auditor.  Section 301 reconstructs the context in which
these choices are made.  It takes three steps: First, it accords the audit committee
“direct” responsibility for hiring the auditor; second, it vests the audit committee
with the power to resolve disputes between the auditor and management; and
third, it requires that the audit committee have authority to hire independent
counsel and advisors.
A significant opportunity is presented.  Section 301 modifies the monitoring
model of the board of directors to import a measure of adversity into the boar-
droom.  With section 301 we at last see a move in that direction—a move to a
model of an independent director with clear cut agenda control and decisional
authority, along with independent sources of support and expertise.  This model
heretofore has been a policy fantasy, described over and over in generations of
articles.
As deployed here, the model approaches the core of the problem, first by
getting the auditor appointment and retention decision out of management’s
hands, and second, by taking the final decision on treatments out of manage-
ment’s hands.  The auditor gets to take a step beyond communicative action (and
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II. RULES VERSUS PRINCIPLES
Sarbanes-Oxley addresses a complex professional problem.  Some of
the problem lies in the form and content of GAAP itself.  Most of the
problem, however, concerns relations between auditors and their clients
and lies at the level of process.  Management, and not the auditor, decides
on accounting treatments.47  It follows in theory that auditors should be
the most independent and adversary of professionals.  Unfortunately, in
practice, our auditors’ corporate clients have captured them to a degree
even more marked than the degree to which the same corporate clients
have captured their lawyers.  This situation follows from multiple causes.
Prime among them are consulting rents, employment opportunities and
industry concentration.48  Now, had the Congress wanted to fix the prob-
lem, it could have drafted a statute that imposed separation between audit
firms and all forms of business consulting.  Separation would have stopped
the rent flows so as to realign the incentives of auditors and ameliorate
their capture by the client interest.  Sarbanes-Oxley, more cautiously opts
for gradual audit reform, facilitating reform without ensuring it, leaving it
to the POB and the SEC to address (or finesse) the problem of industry
capture.  Having opted for gradualism, the Act’s drafters probably had no
alternative but to delegate.
Sarbanes-Oxley only stumbles into outright error when it allocates the
blame for the disaster equally to substance and to process, to GAAP and to
FASB, in addition to the audit firms and their clients.  This part of this
Article asserts that the error, embedded in Sarbanes-Oxley’s commenda-
tion of principles-based accounting, potentially could aggravate the crisis
of confidence.
In theory, there need be nothing objectionable in an initiative that
privileges principles over rules in the articulation of accounting standards
(or, for that matter, any other regulation).  With principles or, in lawyer’s
parlance, “standards,” the regulator brings more finesse to the application
the alternative of giving up the client) to take an objection about a treatment to an
arbitration body, a body that conveniently also happens to be the hiring and firing
agent.  The committee, with its own expert advice, will be in a position to trump
overly aggressive treatments.  Since the auditor looks to the committee rather than
the top brass as its employer, it at least has some incentive to raise objections.
Indeed, the committee does not have to sit back and wait for a dispute.  Under
section 203 of the Act, the auditor not only has to deliver to the committee the
schedule of unadjusted differences, but also has to report on all treatment alterna-
tives discussed with management, their ramifications and the auditor’s preference.
Will the new scheme work?  It certainly cannot hurt.  And, if consulting firms
outside of the Final Four firms can gather in enough accounting and auditing
expertise, it certainly can help.
47. The leading discussion of the resulting incentive problem in the legal
literature is Melvin A. Eisenberg, Legal Models of Management Structure in the Modern
Corporation: Officers, Directors and Accountants, 63 CAL. L. REV. 375 (1975).  Eisen-
berg’s critique continues to resonate in 2003.
48. See id. at 425-26 (noting accountants are under irresistible pressure to go
along with marginal principles).
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of law to fact than occurs with rules.  The principle announces a broad-
brush directive in the expectation that regulatory particulars will derive
from law-to-fact applications over time.  In theory, regulations designed
this way keep regulators in closer touch with ultimate regulatory objectives
even as they allow for variations in the facts of the cases.  In contrast, rule-
based systems tend toward formalism, with the statement of the rule domi-
nating over both the purpose at hand and the particulars of a given case.
Because no system of rules ever can anticipate all the cases, rules need to
be accompanied by backstop standards in any event.  If they are not, then
formalism can be employed to subvert the regulatory purpose as the regu-
lated actors devise strategies of evasion.
The problem respecting principles and rules and GAAP does not di-
rectly implicate either the theoretical advantages of principles or the theo-
retical shortcomings of rules.  It instead concerns the process context in
which issuers and auditors apply both rules and standards.  So long as we
lack confidence in management incentives respecting accounting treat-
ments and doubt that auditors are independent of management interests,
we have no actor plausibly positioned to make the delicate law-to-fact de-
terminations called for in a principles-based system.  If the regulator is not
neutral, then a principle always can be manipulated in favor of the presen-
tation that suits management interests.  The principle does not itself im-
port incentive compatibility.  Accounting rules, with all their flaws, will
continue to be the best choice in a second-best world so long as  they con-
strain managers and auditors most of the time.  Sarbanes-Oxley accord-
ingly moves too quickly in pushing FASB and the SEC in the direction of
principles.  Principles-based accounting may work well in other corporate
governance systems or in our own system at some future time.  But the
incentive problems have to be solved first.
A. The Case for Regulating GAAP
Just as principles are not objectionable in the abstract, so can no ob-
jection be raised in the abstract to the proposition, embodied in Sarbanes-
Oxley, of aggressive federal intervention respecting the terms of GAAP.49
The same incentive problems that make principles-based accounting a bad
choice in the present context make it all the more necessary for Congress
and the SEC to take a proactive oversight role.  GAAP has very close forma-
tive ties to the profession that purveys it, ties even closer than those be-
tween legislatures and judges, and the legal professionals who advise
corporate clients.  Government mandates dictate much of the advice law-
yers give to clients; the government, although heavily populated with law-
yers, at least operates at arm’s length from the legal profession.
49. The SEC already has the power to impose accounting rules.  The SEC
exercises its power only rarely, preferring to leave the job to FASB, which acts
under the threat of intervention should the SEC’s preferences not be satisfied. See
DAVID R. HERWITZ & MATTHEW J. BARRETT, MATERIALS ON ACCOUNTING FOR LAW-
YERS 146 (3d ed. 2001).
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Accounting works differently, operating like a guild both at the legislative
and at the professional level.  Auditors apply law generated within their
own profession, operating at closer quarters with the pertinent lawmaking
institutions than do lawyers.
The governance structure of FASB demonstrates this proximity.  At
first glance we see a structure designed to prevent the big auditing firms
from dominating the body that makes GAAP.  No more than three of
FASB’s seven seats go to public accountants, with the remaining four be-
ing taken by two corporate executives, one financial analyst and one aca-
demic.50  On further consideration, however, the four-to-three split does
not provide a credible guarantee against special interest influence.  Recall
that the incentive problem stems from management’s purchase of the au-
ditor’s loyalty.  Auditors who want to please accordingly have a community
of interest with their audit clients on most hot button issues.  FASB, by
coupling three auditors with two corporate executives, ensures that the
community of interests has a five-to-two voting advantage.  FASB also is a
very small shop, with a staff of only forty-five.51  Add it all up, and a profile
of robust institutional independence does not emerge.
Despite this structural weakness, FASB has conducted itself admirably
in recent years, taking positions opposed to those of management and the
audit profession on key issues like the treatment of good will arising in
mergers and management stock options.52  So the present point is not
that management and professional interests can be expected to have cap-
tured most of GAAP most of the time.  The point instead is that no institu-
tional mechanism ensures that the public interest trumps the interests of
audit firms and their clients in GAAP’s promulgation.
Asymmetries of information and methodological wherewithal further
contribute to the problem.  GAAP is a body of law structurally shielded
from outside inspection.  Monitoring GAAP is difficult—to stay abreast of
substantive issues in accounting is to be a member of the guild in the first
place.
Solidarity within the accounting profession also enhances the case for
outside regulation of GAAP.  Amongst the multitude of talking heads that
provided the media with its sound bites during the corporate crisis of
2002, how many were partners in the big accounting firms?  The reader
will be hard pressed to recall a single audit partner participating in rough
and tumble policy discussions respecting the profession and the regula-
50. See id. at 154.
51. See id.  For funding, it has had to rely on the charitable support of the big
firms, along with a trickle of revenues from publication sales. See id.  Meanwhile,
the Emerging Issues Task Force (EITF), which since 1984 has had the job of pro-
nouncing on cutting-edge requests for advice on appropriate treatments, is a
group comprised almost entirely of representatives of the large firms. See id. at
157.
52. LEVITT, supra note 38, at 106-15.
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tions it applies.53  This profession closes ranks when a major conflict
breaks out between it and the rest of the society and economy.  Profes-
sional solidarity is in turn augmented by industry concentration: As of this
writing there are only four firms left with the wherewithal to conduct au-
dits of large capitalization companies.54  In a universe of four organiza-
tions, discipline is easily maintained.
The legal profession, with all its faults, displays no comparable solidar-
ity.  For every lawyer who closes ranks with a corporate client, there is an-
other lawyer looking to bring suit against that first lawyer’s client or,
alternatively, to get the legislature to authorize a lawsuit.  When the corpo-
ration’s lawyer goes to Capitol Hill to get the client protective legislation,
the trial lawyers also are there, working the other side.  When lawyers ad-
vocate for their clients in public, they are understood to be acting in a
special role.  Any representations they make on a clients’ behalf concern-
ing the state of the law are greeted with skepticism.  Indeed, critique usu-
ally is guaranteed, for a second lawyer will be charged with articulating the
opposing view.
Accountants operate differently as a profession, even as they more
and more resemble lawyers playing an advocacy role for their clients.
Where with lawyers the advocacy appears in briefs and memoranda of law,
with accounting the advocacy merges into the numbers reported on the
clients’ certified financials.  Readers of financial reports are not on notice
to bring skepticism to bear, at least until very recently.  Even if they pro-
ceed cautiously, they get only indirect means, within the reports’ four cor-
ners, with which to sort numbers influenced by advocacy from harder
numbers uninfluenced by management’s agenda.  This does not go to say
that financial reports always are taken at face value.  In theory, Wall
Street’s financial analysts play the critical function.  Unfortunately, in re-
cent practice, they too have lacked the incentive to criticize.55  Nor can we
expect critique to arise from within the accounting profession, not one
faction of which has a financial stake in articulating adversary positions.
The entire burden of critique and correction has devolved on FASB, the
SEC accounting office and a handful of academics.
In sum, structural reasons should keep us suspicious of GAAP as well
as of financial reports issued pursuant to it.  It follows that both may need
to be addressed in a meaningful post-Enron reform program.
53. We must put to one side Arthur Andersen’s Joe Berardino, who publicly
and unsuccessfully acted out the role of the CEO trying to quell an organizational
conflagration.
54. See LEVITT, supra note 38 (discussing recent history of large public ac-
counting firms).
55. The incentive problem stems from underwriting and other rent streams
flowing from the issuers of financial reports to the employers of analysts.  It is not
clear that the problem admits of an easy solution.  Absent that corrupting rent
flow, it is not clear that resources exist to support an adequate flow of critical
analysis.
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B. Enron, GAAP, Regulatory Arbitrage and Strategic Evasion
Misleading treatments of off-balance sheet entities lie at the Enron
scandal’s core.  Dissatisfaction with the applicable rules and their form-
over-substance approach has been widespread.  FASB itself consistently
has numbered among the dissatisfied voices, for two decades, keeping
open a project inquiring into an alternative approach with a principles-
based definition of control.56 Unfortunately, FASB abandoned that pro-
ject as a failure even as the Enron scandal was breaking.  After the scandal
broke, FASB responded to widespread criticism with a couple of Enron-
responsive exposure drafts.57  The body responsible for GAAP thereby im-
plicitly admitted that its rules had failed.
FASB’s admission of a rule failure tells us more about its weakness as a
political player than it does about the operation of GAAP.58  In acting out
the role of a deficient lawmaker, FASB confirms a conventional wisdom
circulating in the wake of the scandal.  That is, the assumption that there
must have been something wrong with the rules or a disaster this big never
could have occurred.  The story has it that Enron exploited highly techni-
cal but flawed accounting rules in setting up and accounting for sham
transactions.  The transactions exploited the rules governing Special Pur-
pose Entities (SPEs).  By carefully but cynically hewing to the rules, Enron
managed to overstate its earnings materially.  Had the rules been better
drafted, Enron would have been forced to consolidate the results of the
sham SPEs with its own results.  Consolidation in turn would have de-
prived Enron of the opportunity to misstate its earnings.59
56. See CONSOLIDATED FINANCIAL STATEMENTS: PURPOSE AND POLICY, Proposed
Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 194-B (Fin. Accounting Stan-
dards Bd. 1999) (proposed Feb. 23, 1999).
57. See CONSOLIDATION OF CERTAIN SPECIAL PURPOSE ENTITIES—AN INTERPRE-
TATION OF ARB NO. 51, Proposed Statement of Financial Accounting Standards
(Fin. Accounting Standards Bd. 2002) (proposed July 1, 2002).  This draft deals
with SPEs and would have caused the consolidation of Enron’s LJM 1 and 2.  It also
increases the outside equity requirement to ten percent for a residual class of SPEs
that would have included those in question.  A second initiative addresses disclo-
sures of guarantees, on the purport that the present rules lack clarity. See GUARAN-
TOR’S ACCOUNTING AND DISCLOSURE REQUIREMENTS FOR GUARANTEES, INCLUDING
INDIRECT GUARANTEES OF INDEBTEDNESS OF OTHERS, Interpretation of Financial Ac-
counting Standards No. 45 (Fin. Accounting Standards Bd.) (Nov. 25, 2002).
58. Significantly, reporting companies and the big accounting firms, notably
including Andersen and Enron, vigorously opposed FASB’s consolidation project,
criticizing the FASB’s draft as unworkable. See Steve Burkholder, Accounting: Out-
look 2002—Enron Sets Agenda of Regulators, Rulemakers; FASB Forges on With Projects,
34 SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) 214, 215-16 (2002) (noting that strong criticism has
prevented FASB from issuing comprehensive consolidations accounting stan-
dards); Glenn R. Simpson, Power Play: Deals That Took Enron Under Had Many Sup-
porters, WALL ST. J., Apr. 10, 2002, at A1, A13 (asserting that FASB shelved its
project amid industry criticism).
59. One finds this story casually mentioned as accepted wisdom in the pages
of the New York Times at the end of 2002. See Kurt Eichenwald, A Higher Standard for
Corporate Advice, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 23, 2002, at A1, A20 (quoting Professor Frank
Partnoy as follows: “Enron was following the letter of the law in nearly all of its
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Generalizing from the story, GAAP failed in respect of Enron because
it regulates by rule, articulating layer on layer of precise instructions.  Such
precise, rule-based systems of regulation are always open to manipulation
in the hands of clever and high-priced accountants and lawyers pursuing
regulatory arbitrage.  Had GAAP followed from a different regulatory
strategy, articulating general substantive principles respecting consolida-
tion and SPEs, there would have been no loophole through which the bad
actors at Enron could have driven their fleet of sham SPE trucks.
The story is accurate in one respect—the rules respecting accounting
for transactions with SPEs are badly drafted and incomplete.  But in all
other respects the story is nonsense.  Enron, in fact, did not follow the
rules.60  Had it done so, the substance of all of its questionable dealings
with SPEs would have been disclosed in its financial statements.  It follows
that the rules did not fail.  This is a case less of regulatory arbitrage than of
strategic evasion.  The failure lay with actors at Enron and its auditor, Ar-
thur Andersen.
It is true that the SPE transactions at the heart of the Enron scandal
emerged from an exhaustive planning process and that they were de-
signed to comply with the rules even as they exploited the rules’ structural
weaknesses.  Under FAS No. 140, issued in 2000, transfers of financial as-
sets to SPEs are treated as sales by the transferor firm so long as, among
other things, equity interests in the SPE are not returned as consideration
for the assets transferred and the SPE gets control of the assets with the
right to pledge or exchange them.61  To comply with the standard, all one
must do is have the SPE vehicle meet the requirement of an outside equity
interest with an investment constituting three percent of the value of the
assets transferred to the SPEs.62  It also is true that at the time Enron set
up the critical “LJM I” and “LJM II” SPEs and entered into transactions
with them, the transactions arguably complied with the rules.  But, as the
Powers Report details at length, the transaction structures had intrinsic
flaws and went out of compliance with the three percent rule very soon
after the transactions closed.63  Had Enron followed the rules at that
point, it would have been forced to consolidate the SPEs into its financials.
deals.  It is fair to say that the most serious allegations of criminal wrongdoing at
Enron had almost nothing to do with the company’s collapse.  Instead it was the
type of transaction that is still legal”).  For further discussion of this viewpoint, see
Frank Partnoy, A Revisionist View of Enron and the Sudden Death of “May”, 48 VILL. L.
REV. (forthcoming 2003).
60. For further discussion of FASB’s three percent rule governing SPEs, see
infra notes 61-72 and accompanying text.
61. ACCOUNTING FOR TRANSFERS AND SERVICING OF FINANCIAL ASSETS AND EX-
TINGUISHMENTS OF LIABILITIES, Summary of Statement of Financial Accounting
Standards No. 140, ¶¶ 29, 34 (Fin. Accounting Standards Bd. 2000) [hereinafter
SFAS 140].
62. See id.
63. See WILLIAM C. POWERS, JR. ET AL., REPORT OF INVESTIGATION BY THE SPE-
CIAL INVESTIGATIVE COMMITTEE OF THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS OF ENRON CORP., 2002
WL 198018.
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Had the SPEs been consolidated, the results of transactions with the SPEs
would have dropped off of both the balance sheet and income statement,
with the result that Enron would not have been able to pump up its net
earnings with revenues and gains from its SPE transactions.  The
financials, of course, were not consolidated, but not because of the rules.
Instead, Enron’s managers resorted to the old fashioned expedient of
concealment.
Significantly, Enron’s financials would have been out of compliance
with GAAP even with its SPEs in compliance with the rules on consolida-
tion at all times.  Under FAS No. 57, contracts between Enron and the
LJM-related SPEs were “related party transactions.”  This category includes
transactions with a counterparty whose policies are sufficiently influenced
by the first party so as to prevent one of the parties from fully pursuing its
own interests.  Given such a tie, special footnote descriptions of the trans-
actions are required, including dollar amount impacts on reported earn-
ings.64  Such footnote disclosures would have provided investors with the
substantive equivalent of a set of consolidated reports.  But, of course, En-
ron did not wish to make clear the truth respecting its earnings, and its
cooperative auditor failed to insist that it follow the rules on related party
transactions.
A similar situation prevailed with the second reporting failure at the
core of the Enron scandal.  The straw that broke the camel’s back and
forced Enron into bankruptcy in December 2001 was its last minute revela-
tion of $4 billion of unreported contingent guarantees of obligations of
unconsolidated equity affiliates, obligations about to come due.65  As to
these obligations GAAP has a definite instruction.  To guarantee an equity
affiliate’s obligations is to take the disclosure treatment out of the parent-
subsidiary or parent-investee context for treatment under the rules on
contingent losses.  Those rules state a clear cut case for disclosure.  Under
FAS No. 5, loss contingencies are divided into three classes—probable,
reasonably possible and remote.  Probable losses should be accrued; rea-
sonably possible losses should be disclosed in footnotes with information
as to nature and magnitude; remote losses need not be disclosed.  There is
a separate rule for financial guarantees.  With guarantees, even if the pos-
sibility of loss is remote, there must be footnote disclosure as to nature and
amount.66  Enron failed to make those disclosures because they would
64. See RELATED PARTY DISCLOSURES, Statement of Financial Accounting Stan-
dards No. 57 ¶¶ 2, 24(f) (Fin. Accounting Standards Bd. 1982).
65. See Bratton, supra note 1, at 1320-25 (detailing Enron’s collapse due to
high risk and hidden financial strategies).
66. See ACCOUNTING FOR CONTINGENCIES, Statement of Financial Accounting
Standard No. 5 ¶ 5 (Fin. Accounting Standards Bd. 1975).  Paragraph 12 reads:
“The Board concludes that disclosure of [guarantees of indebtedness of others and
others that in substance have the same characteristic] shall be continued.  The
disclosure shall include the nature and amount of the guarantee.” Id. ¶ 12; see also
DISCLOSURE OF INDIRECT GUARANTEES OF INDEBTEDNESS OF OTHERS, Interpretation
of Financial Accounting Standard No. 34 (Fin. Accounting Standards Bd. 1981);
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have meant a rating agency downgrade from investment grade status, and
Enron needed an investment grade rating to run its trading business.  As a
result, Enron materially understated its obligations as guarantor, perpe-
trating an old fashioned financial fraud by concealment.  It comes as no
surprise that thus stated, Enron’s financials were not in compliance with
GAAP.67
The conventional wisdom errs in a second respect as well.  The story
blames the complex rules that determine accounting for SPE transactions.
It asserts that had FASB adopted a principles-based approach to consolida-
tion of related entity financial statements, Enron would have been dis-
abled from perpetrating its fraud.  Unfortunately for the story, the
complex rules governing SPEs in FAS No. 140 apply only to mainstream
transactions, like the securitization of pools of mortgages.  Enron’s SPE
transactions did not flow in the mainstream governed by FAS No. 140.
They instead fell into a category of “other” SPE transactions not covered
directly by a FASB rule.68  For transactions in this residual category, the
critical requirement is a minimum outside equity investment.  As to this
requirement, the accounting firms have used a three percent rule of
thumb test, derived from an SEC accounting opinion.69  This approach
dates from a 1991 letter of the Chief Accountant of the SEC issued in
respect of a leasing transaction.70  To read the letter is to see that the SEC
required three percent outside equity on the facts of the case and never
intended three percent to be taken as a one-size-fits-all test.71  Since 1991,
the SEC has insisted repeatedly that there is no three percent test and that
the level of outside equity funding for a qualifying SPE in the residual
HERWITZ & BARRETT, supra note 49, at 617-20.  Note that under SFAS No. 140, a
separate recourse obligation against the transferor of an asset to an SPE in respect
of reimbursement for losses on the underlying portfolio (as opposed to a deriva-
tive arrangement) continues to be treated under SFAS No. 5.  That is, the trans-
feror makes an ongoing assessment of the amount of the loss in its financials
rather than adjusting the obligation to fair value and reporting it in income. See
SFAS 140, supra note 61, ¶ 29.
67. Having violated GAAP, Enron’s financials, therefore, were per se mislead-
ing for securities law purposes. See Administrative Policy on Financial Statements,
Accounting Series Release No. 4, 11 Fed. Reg. 10,913 (Apr. 25, 1938), codified at
CODIFICATION OF FINANCIAL REPORTING POLICIES § 101, reprinted in [1937-1982
Transfer Binder] 7 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 72,005, at 62,101  (providing SEC’s
standard for misleading financial statements).
68. See SFAS 140, supra note 61, ¶ 34.
69. The GAAP authorities are TRANSACTIONS INVOLVING SPECIAL PURPOSE ENTI-
TIES, Statement of Financial Accounting Standards EITF Topic D-14 (Fin. Account-
ing Standards Bd. 2002); IMPACT OF NONSUBSTANTIVE LESSORS, RESIDUAL VALUE
GUARANTEES AND OTHER PROVISIONS IN LEASING TRANSACTIONS, Statement of Finan-
cial Accounting Standards EITF Topic 96-21 (Fin. Accounting Standards Bd.
2002); IMPLEMENTATION ISSUES IN ACCOUNTING FOR LEASING TRANSACTIONS INVOLV-
ING SPECIAL PURPOSE ENTITIES, Statement of Financial Accounting Standards EITF
Topic 96-21 (Fin. Accounting Standards Bd. 2002).
70. See Bratton, supra note 1, at 1307 n.118.
71. See id. (discussing SEC’s insistence that there is no bright-line three per-
cent test).
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category should follow from the nature of the transaction.72  In the SEC’s
view, the question is not whether sufficient outside equity capital has been
invested to ensure the SPE’s independence.  The outside equity require-
ment is thus intended not to be a “rule” but a “principle” or “standard”
with the amount to be increased or decreased on the facts of the case.
Yet, despite the SEC’s jawboning on the matter, the audit firms ap-
plied the SEC’s outside equity standard as a three percent test, a narrow
rule.  Certainly this was the operative assumption when Enron planned its
SPE transactions.
Contrary to the conventional wisdom, then, the central problem lay
not with the rules themselves but with Enron’s failure to follow them.  The
disaster stemmed not from any structural problem with the rules but from
Enron’s corruption and its auditor’s incentive problems.
More generally, there can be no denying that practitioners often take
advantage of GAAP’s rule structures when they design aggressive treat-
ments.  Regulatory arbitrage—the practice of structuring an inappropriate
transaction so it stays within the bounds set by a rule73—is clearly wide-
spread.  But these rules-based aggressive treatments, which tend to involve
structured finance, leases and (until recently) pooled mergers, do not
show up in large numbers on the list of recent accounting restatements.74
The reason is that the rules make the treatments GAAP compliant, even as
many observers disapprove of the treatments.75  Issues still arise for FASB.
But the indicated course of action appears to be amendment of rules to
adjust their categories to yield reporting results following from the rules’
operative principles.  Like the Enron accounting restatements, those of
other companies follow less from regulatory arbitrage than from strategic
noncompliance—action under an interpretation of the law in conflict with
the stated interpretation of the regulator.76  Neither rules nor standards
prevent such conduct, and, as between the two, rules could even have the
advantage in deterring it.  Meanwhile, in every case of a restatement,
GAAP by definition has proved adequate to the job of identifying the mis-
statement and providing corrective instructions.77
72. See Dominick J. Ragone III, Current Accounting Projects, 2000 Confer-
ence on SEC Developments (Dec. 4, 2000).
73. See Timothy F. Malloy, Regulation and the Compliance Norm, (Working Pa-
per, 2003) (on file with author).
74. Revenue overstatements make up the largest category of recent restate-
ments, at thirty-nine percent, with cost understatements coming in second at six-
teen percent. See GAO REPORT, supra note 2, at 18.
75. See Mark W. Nelson, et al., Where Do Companies Attempt Earnings Manage-
ment, and When Do Auditors Prevent It?, (SSRN Working Paper, June 2000), available
at http://www.ssrn.com (showing that auditors pass on these treatments as GAAP
compliant).
76. See Malloy, supra note 73.
77. The rule might be over inclusive; that is, it might bring inappropriate
transactions into a given zone of treatment.  A rule also might be under inclusive;
that is, it might allow a transaction that should be included in a treatment category
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C. Rules and Principles in Theory and in Practice
In the previous section we saw a standard setting agency, the SEC,
articulate a standard and tell the auditors to apply it as such, only to have
the auditors instead apply the standard as a rigid numerical rule.  The
auditors in effect invented a rule where none existed.  Why did they do
this?  To what do we attribute this problem of communication and compli-
ance?  The process of answering these questions gives us insight into
problems accompanying a principles-based approach to accounting.
1. The Framework of the Debate
Auditors in this country like rules.  They want more of them.  Indeed,
the then Big Five accounting firms responded to the Enron crisis by de-
manding more rules and blaming regulators for failing to supply them.
Joe Berardino, the managing partner of the ill-fated Andersen firm, led
the charge.  The real failure, he said, lay not in his firm’s audit but in
accounting rules themselves, which permit off-balance sheet financing
through SPEs.  If something went wrong with Enron’s financials, then the
rules ought to be rethought.78  The burden to effect improvement, said
the accounting firms, lay on the SEC rather than on their own audit prac-
tices.  Accordingly, to restore confidence, the SEC should supply “immedi-
ate guidance” to public companies respecting disclosure of off-balance
sheet transactions, over the counter derivative contracts, and related-party
transactions.79  In particular, the SEC should require issuers to provide
more details respecting off-balance sheet guarantees, commitments, lease
and debt arrangements that could impact on credit ratings, earnings, cash
flow or stock price.80
Commentators from outside the accounting industry quickly coun-
tered with the opposite complaint.  The problem with GAAP, they said,
lies in its exhaustive check-the-box system of rules.  Auditors apply the
rules mechanically, ignoring the substance of the clients’ transactions.81
The rule-based system of regulation fosters the culture of noncompliance,
as the actors regulated by the rules invest in schemes of evasion.  Harvey
Pitt, the ill-fated SEC chairman, joined this responsive chorus:
Present-day accounting standards are cumbersome and offer far
too detailed prescriptive requirements for companies and their
to be structured so as not to be included. See Cass R. Sunstein, Problems with Rules,
83 CAL. L. REV. 953, 995 (1995).
78. See Joe Berardino, Enron: A Wake-Up Call, WALL ST. J., Dec. 4, 2001, at A18.
79. See Judith Burns & Michael Schroeder, Accounting Firms Ask SEC for Post-
Enron Guide, WALL ST. J., Jan. 7, 2002, at A16.
80. See id.
81. See Steve Liesman, SEC Accounting Cop’s Warning: Playing by Rules May Not
Ward Off Fraud Issues, WALL ST. J., Feb. 12, 2002, at C1 (discussing voluminous
accounting standards to shield auditors from liability); Leaders: The Lessons from
Enron, ECONOMIST, Feb. 9, 2002, at 9-10 (finding accounting standards, in some
areas, “so prescriptive that they have lost sight of broader principles”).
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accountants to follow. . . .  We seek to move toward a principles-
based set of accounting standards, where mere compliance with
technical prescriptions is neither sufficient nor the objective.82
Pitt’s criticism eventually found its way into Sarbanes-Oxley’s section
108(d), which directs an inquiry into the feasibility of a principles-based
system.
A disturbing commonality ties the audit firms’ request for more rules
and the responsive request for principles.  Even as the discussants take
opposite sides concerning the drafting of GAAP, they come together in
blaming GAAP for the current crisis.  In the case of the accounting firms,
denial and avoidance appear to be at work: To the extent blame attaches
to the rules, attention is deflected from incentive problems tied to consult-
ing rents.  More particularly, to look at Enron and the other scandals is to
see auditors going beyond technical manipulation to opine favorably on
material misstatements that clearly violate the rules.  The negative implica-
tions for current audit practice are staggering, so much so as to prompt an
attack on the rules as an affirmative defense.  The same motivation seems
to have figured into Harvey Pitt’s argument of the opposite side of the
case.  Pitt’s original reform program included a toothless accounting over-
sight regime, lambasted for its overprotection of the audit firms, which
happened to be Pitt’s former clients.83
The argument for principles also dovetails with the interests of certain
marketplace actors.  Because International Accounting Standards (IAS), a
body of accounting principles widely used by firms outside of the United
States, is a principles-based regime, the argument for principles in GAAP
overlaps the argument in favor of SEC acceptance of financial reporting
pursuant to IAS.  Thus, we can expect to hear the argument from every
intermediary on Wall Street who would like to see more rents from foreign
listing business, along with actors in the European and Asian offices of the
Final Four firms.  We also can expect to hear it from Europeans and
Asians who, during the past decade, have listened in exasperation to
82. Testimony Concerning the Corporate and Auditing Accountability, Responsibility,
and Transparency Act; Hearing Before the House Comm. on Fin. Serv., 107th Cong. (Mar.
20, 2002) (statement of Harvey L. Pitt, Chairman, SEC), available at http://
www.sec.gov/news/testimony/032002tshlp.htm (last visited Apr. 11, 2003).
83. Pitt proposed an independent regulatory body, governed by an indepen-
dent board, to be effectuated only with the cooperation of the Big Five. See
Michael Schroeder, SEC Proposes  Accounting Disciplinary Body, WALL ST. J., Jan. 17,
2002, at C1.  Critics pounced immediately, arguing that too many CPAs would be
present in the proposed enforcement structure. See Diana B. Henriques, Policing
the Accountants with a Watchdog from the Accounting Business, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 21,
2002, at A12.  The critics claimed that the defendants could stall the process until
the completion of overlapping litigation and that the absence of subpoena power
will disable the enforcers from gathering necessary evidence.  To import such
power, a statute was needed. See Mike McNamee, Pitt’s Accounting Fix Leaves a Lot
Broke, BUS. WK., Feb. 4, 2002, at 38-39.  Indeed, Pitt’s proposal did not come close
to restoring confidence in the wake of Enron.  A statute, Sarbanes-Oxley, had to be
drafted.
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Americans claiming evolutionary superiority for the U.S. corporate gov-
ernance system.84  The crisis of confidence in the U.S. markets gives them
a welcome opportunity to turn the argument around.
2. Principles as Rules
Many make the argument for principles-based accounting absent pri-
vate agenda items, motivated by the view that principles will work better
than rules and could materially improve the quality of financial reporting.
In evaluating the argument, the first question that arises concerns the
meaning of “principles.”  Principles are accounting standards more
broadly stated, ignoring particulars of application on their face.  Applied
literally they can work like rules, rules that impose common treatments
across ranges of subject matter differing as to particulars.  Applied flexibly,
with a view to the purpose behind the statement, principles can enhance
the discretion of managers and auditors in the selection of accounting
treatments.85
To the extent the discussants refer to “principles” as broad-brush
statements that would apply as constraining mandates, a couple of results
can be predicted.  There would indeed be a decrease in the level of report-
ing detail.  At the same time, comparability of treatment across different
issuers would be enhanced.  But the decrease in complexity implies a con-
comitant loss of transparency, since commonality of treatment obscures
particulars in the economics of differing underlying transactions.86  In the
minds of many observers, these pluses and minuses would net out clearly
on the plus side to the extent that the principles’ broad-brush statements
prohibited whole classes of aggressive treatments, substituting strong con-
servative mandates.  Note that on this scenario, “principles” would be bet-
ter described as tough, general rules.87
A question arises: How likely in the present political and institutional
context is it that reporting companies, their auditors and their friends in
Washington would permit FASB to use principles-based accounting to
usher in a new era of strict treatments?  The answer must be, very unlikely.
84. See, e.g., David P. Hale, Saving the Banks: Learning from Germany and Japan,
WALL ST. J., Feb. 4, 1991, at A10.
85. Under the flexible approach, firms in the same industry could apply dif-
ferent treatments, with the accountants tailoring the general principles to the re-
porting firm’s particular needs.  For a description, see Joshua Ronen, Post Enron
Reform: Financial Statement Insurance and GAAP Re-Visited, 8 STAN. J. L. BUS. & FIN.
39, 60-65 (2002).
86. The comments in the text draw on FASB, PRINCIPLES APPROACH, supra
note 7, at 7.
87. FASB’s proposal respecting principles, in effect, warns audit firms and is-
suers of this when it points out that principles will mean more volatility in reported
earnings figures. See id. at 7-8.
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3. Principles as Flexible Standards
If principles-based accounting does not hold out a new era of strict
treatments, then it follows that a move to principles means a move to the
general but flexible guidelines that lawyers call “standards.”88  To the pol-
icy argument for principles as standards, I offer four points in rebuttal.
a. GAAP Already Combines Standards and Rules
The first rebuttal admits the correctness of the view controverted: Yes,
an effective system of accounting principles must build on principles and
cannot be constructed entirely of rules.  This point is so fundamental that
we can even prove it by reference to GAAP.  GAAP is already built on
broad and powerful principles, seven of them: (1) historical cost, (2) ob-
jectivity or verifiability, (3) revenue recognition, (4) matching, (5) consis-
tency, (6) full disclosure and (7) relevance or fair value.89  FASB
expounds on the principles’ meaning in a series of Concepts Statements.90
The last principle on the list, fair value, lately has been growing in
importance at the expense of the first two on the list, historical cost and
verifiability.91  Tension results—there is no way to have a system requiring
verifiable numbers and at the same time offering fair value figures.  That
tension is being resolved in favor of fair value, as GAAP moves away from a
mandate that all reported numbers be hard numbers toward a system that
includes many numbers that result from judgment calls, but that, in the-
ory, offer a better picture of the present value of the firm.92  Other ten-
sions come into the picture when we reference two modifying
conventions—materiality, which lets the auditor disregard minor misappli-
88. Duncan Kennedy offers the classic description of standards in American
jurisprudence. See generally Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Ad-
judication, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1685 (1976).  Harvey Pitt and other accounting princi-
ples advocates would have been well advised to read it.
89. See HERWITZ & BARRETT, supra note 49, at 67-70.
90. For FASB’s discussion of these in the context of the principles-based ac-
counting movement of 2002, see FASB, PRINCIPLES APPROACH, supra note 7, at 5-7.
91. See generally, PRELIMINARY VIEWS ON MAJOR ISSUES RELATED TO REPORTING
FINANCIAL INSTRUMENTS AND CERTAIN RELATED ASSETS AND LIABILITIES AT FAIR
VALUE (Fin. Accounting Standards Bd., Dec. 14, 1999); Stanley Siegel, The Coming
Revolution in Accounting: The Emergence of Fair Value as the Fundamental Principle of
GAAP, 42 WAYNE L. REV. 1839 (1996).
92. Note that Sarbanes-Oxley section 108(a) directs FASB to prioritize the
consideration of new rules reflecting “emerging accounting principles and chang-
ing business practices.” See supra note 6 (containing full text of section 108(a)).
This presumably means more movement to fair value treatments.  Congress over-
looks the fact that the same movement certainly played a role in the accounting
mess at Enron, where market to market and fair value accounting of its derivative
and energy contracts contributed mightily to suspicions about its earnings figures.
See The Fall of Enron: How Could it Have Happened?; Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on
Gov’t Affairs, 107th Cong. 58-74 (Jan. 24, 2002) (statement of Frank Partnoy, Pro-
fessor of Law, University of San Diego Law School).  Common sense indicates that
we should readjust the balance in favor of verifiability, at least until the crisis has
passed.
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cations of the rules, and conservatism, which counsels understatement in
case of doubt.  Between historical cost, verifiability and conservatism on
the one hand, and fair value and materiality on the other, there’s a lot of
room for good faith dispute about the best way to state a firm’s results.
We begin to see a “principled” reason for GAAP’s evolution toward
rules.  This is the very territory where cost considerations most strongly
justify a rule-based approach: GAAP governs homogeneous, recurrent situ-
ations where the actors need ex ante instructions and have incentives to
invest in compliance.93  An across-the-board shift to standards would make
sense only if the costs of constant revision of the rules to keep up with
unintended applications due to faulty drafting outweighed the benefits of
advance specification.  GAAP does not appear to lie anywhere near that
level of dysfunction.
b. Rules Enable Disempowered Professionals to Say No to their Clients
The present problem lies not with GAAP’s mix of rules and princi-
ples, which no more mesh like the parts of a machine here than they do
any other regulatory context,94 but with its context of application.  An in-
dependent auditor is supposed to make reference GAAP’s standards in
filling in the inevitable gaps in the rules or in answering questions of inter-
pretation under the rules.  Such law-to-fact applications should with some
frequency lead the auditor to say no to aggressive treatments chosen by
the client, on grounds of full disclosure and conservatism.  Sir David
Tweedie, Chairman of the International Accounting Standards Board
(IASB), stressed the importance of professional judgment in a principles-
based system in recent congressional testimony:
We favour an approach that requires the company and its auditor
to take a step back and consider whether the accounting sug-
gested is consistent with the underlying principle.  This is not a
soft option.  Our approach requires both companies and their
auditors to exercise professional judgment in the public interest.
Our approach requires a strong commitment from preparers to
financial statements that provide a faithful representation of all
transactions and a strong commitment from auditors to resist cli-
ent pressures.  It will not work without these commitments . . . .95
93. See Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J.
557, 570-77 (1992).
94. See FASB, PRINCIPLES APPROACH, supra note 7, at 6.
95. Accounting and Investor Protection Issues Raised by Enron and Other Public Com-
panies: International Accounting Standards and Necessary Reforms to Improve Financial
Reporting; Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on Banking, Hous. & Urban Affairs, 107th
Cong. (Feb. 14, 2002) (statement of Sir David Tweedie, Chairman, International
Accounting Standards Board), available at http://www.banking.senate.gov/
02_02hrg/021402/tweedie.htm (last visited Apr. 11, 2003).
1050 VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 48: p. 1023
To apply principles in the manner contemplated requires an exercise of
judgment, an exercise that captured auditors are disabled from making.
Before saying no to a client, our auditors insist on the backing of a precise
instruction.  This provides an additional explanation for why our system
has evolved in a rules-based direction.
Now, auditors only mimic the actions of corporate lawyers in demand-
ing rules.  When telling their clients that a course of action is prohibited,
lawyers too like to draw from an explicit statutory bar or a case on all fours.
That way lawyers denude negative responses of the suggestion that the nay
saying stems from the lawyer rather than an external authority.  From a
compliance point of view, it follows that a standard can work better when
the professional dispensing advice is empowered vis a vis the client.  Only
then will the professional’s judgment call on all the facts be respected.
Unfortunately, the present balance of power between auditors and clients
does not appear to favor the auditor’s professional judgment.
c. The Trend to Rules Covers All of Business Law
The third rebuttal also admits the correctness of the view contro-
verted: Yes, GAAP has become too rule based.  The admission is a rebuttal
because the same thing has been happening across business law as a
whole, which has been evolving away from broad standards and toward
precise rules.  Business law and lawyers no longer subscribe to the legal
realists’ view that fact specific adjudication under standards makes law
more responsive.96  As an example, compare the old Uniform Partnership
Act,97 drafted early in the twentieth century, with a Revised Uniform Part-
nership Act,98 drafted at the end of the century.  The former is a collec-
tion of short, general statements.  The latter is a labyrinthine affair that
looks like it is trying to answer every question that ever came up about
partnership governance.  Alternatively, one might track the evolution of
the UCC and the cases there under over the last three decades.  One will
find new drafts more and more complicated than the originals and the
courts abandoning general ideas like liberal construction99 and good
faith.100  The drafters no longer leave it to the case law to fill in the details.
96. See William W. Bratton, Berle and Means Reconsidered at the Century’s Turn,
26 J. CORP. L. 737, 746-47 (2001).
97. See UNIF. P’SHIP ACT, 6 U.L.A. 275 (1914).
98. See REVISED UNIF. P’SHIP ACT, 6 U.L.A. 1 (1997).
99. See Gregory E. Maggs, Karl Llewellyn’s Fading Imprint on the Jurisprudence of
the Uniform Commercial Code, 71 U. COLO. L. REV. 541, 564-72 (2000) (describing
original UCC collaborators’ desire for “purposeful interpretation” of Code
provisions).
100. See William W. Bratton, Venture Capital on the Downside: Preferred Stock and
Corporate Control, 100 MICH. L. REV. 891, 933-34 (2002) (describing application of
good faith within context of interpreting debt and preferred stock agreements).
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Instead they pursue the impossible dream of creating complete sets of in-
structions, just like the accountants.101
Many reasons for the movement to rules can be suggested.  Confi-
dence in judicial decision making has declined even as the expense of
litigating questions of interpretation has risen.  In commercial law con-
texts the scope of jury control over mixed law and fact questions expanded
materially over the latter part of the twentieth century, destabilizing the
expectations of business people.  There also circulates a general notion
that specific instructions import certainty that enhances economic wel-
fare.102  Finally, lawyers turn to rules because they want to reduce risk both
for themselves and their clients.  A rule imports a safe harbor and control
of future events where a standard does not.
To sum up, GAAP and business law have moved to rules because audi-
tors, lawyers and clients alike demand clear instructions.  They put the
burden of clarity on the lawmaker so as to relieve themselves of the bur-
den of making judgments under uncertainty.  This is not a healthy devel-
opment.  But the fault lies not in the proliferating rule books.  The fault
occurs at the point of demand; drafters will continue to generate
rulebooks until the demand ceases.  Similarly, the resulting rulebooks will
be seen as inflexible and burdensome only if the demand lets up.
d. Transparency
We proceed to the fourth rebuttal.  For the sake of argument, let us
assume that auditors and clients stop demanding greater rule specificity
tomorrow, freeing us to interrogate anew the question of whether GAAP
should be articulated in rules or in principles.  It is submitted that the case
for the status quo—a rule-based approach backed by a small collection of
general principles—is materially stronger in respect of accounting than in
respect of business law generally.  To see why, we go back to the realist
case for standards over rules in respect of private law adjudication.  That
case presupposes that the law-to-fact application is explained and pub-
lished in a judicial opinion.  The reported cases give the practitioner an
expanding body of fact sensitive applications, ever better articulating the
standard’s meaning.  Over time, the accumulated case law offers the prac-
titioners a level of certainty not dissimilar to that of a rulebook, even as the
standard’s flexibility is retained.  Meanwhile, the substantive direction of
the cases is open for public inspection.
The ongoing rules-based articulation of GAAP by FASB and other
public bodies works similarly.103  But the application of open-ended ac-
101. For example, compare the original UCC Article 9 and the revised Article
9 on the perfection and priorities of security interests. See U.C.C. §§ 9-301—9-318,
3A U.L.A. 859-1037, 3B U.L.A. 33-386 (1972); U.C.C. §§ 9-301—9-342, 3 U.L.A.
154-301 (2000).
102. I do not endorse the stated proposition.
103. According to FASB, any bias toward rules in contemporary GAAP stems
from exactly this sort of law-to-fact development process; as rules are rewritten to
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counting principles by reporting firms and auditors does not.  Financial
statements and footnotes are very summary documents.  Decision making
about treatments goes on in a black box, evolving as a matter of practice
amongst the insiders.104  There is no comparable moment of transparency
respecting the law-to-fact application.  This diminishes the chance for
outside evaluation.  The law-to-fact decisions, meanwhile, are not made by
judges empowered by the state.  They come from the users—the regulated
actors themselves—acting with an input of the auditor’s professional re-
view.  And a professional, even one historically conceived to be in an ad-
versary posture to its client, is in a materially different position from a
judge.  Adjudicatory authority imports absolute power to say no.  The
outside professional can only suggest no, on pain of giving up the client.
Today’s auditors are disinclined even to threaten to walk, much less actu-
ally to forego the rent flowing from a given audit engagement.  A serious
incentive problem results, a problem that makes a move to flexible, open-
ended principles an invitation to disaster.
D. International Convergence
The incentive problem tied to audit and consulting rents and the in-
centive problem tied to the clients’ demand for rules are both bound up
in the same professional relationship, that between the auditor and the
audit client.  Client demands appear to have become so intense and con-
sulting opportunities have become so lucrative as to overwhelm the self-
regulatory system’s traditional incentive bedrock—the auditor’s interest in
a reputation for conservatism and fidelity to the interests of investors.
Given this relational dynamic, Sarbanes-Oxley triggers concerns when in
section 108(a) it orders FASB to move toward “international convergence
on high quality accounting standards.”
FASB compliantly has responded.105  Indeed, this is an ongoing pro-
cess.  FASB and IASB have been working together to move accounting to-
ward international convergence for some years now.106  As with principles-
based accounting, the proposition of international convergence is unob-
jectionable in the abstract.  The problem concerns potential perverse ef-
fects in the context of this country’s prevailing institutional arrangements.
Perverse effects could occur to the extent that convergence means
adoption of approaches developed against a different relational back-
ground.  IASB draws primarily on input from accountants in Europe and
Asia, where corporate governance works differently than it does here.  In
this country, separation of ownership and control tends to prevail—stock-
take into account different transactional facts, interpretive opinions accumulate.
See FASB, PRINCIPLES APPROACH, supra note 7, at 3-4.
104. For a good example of this practice, see supra notes 61-72 and accompa-
nying text for discussion of the three percent rule as applied to SPEs.
105. See PROJECT UPDATES, SHORT-TERM INTERNATIONAL CONVERGENCE (Fin.
Accounting Standards Bd. 2002).
106. See HERWITZ & BARRETT, supra note 49, at 161-67.
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holders do not get to tell management what to do and information asym-
metries are pronounced.  On the continent of Europe, in contrast, control
of large capitalization firms tends to be vested in majority or near-majority
holdings of stock held in the hands of one, two or a small group of large
investors.  Blockholding also prevails in the Japanese keiretsu system, al-
though individual and family holders are less prominent.107  There,
blockholding means aggregations of smaller blocks than in Europe, held
by (a) clusters of banks having lending relationships with the issuer firm,
and (b) clusters of other nonfinancial companies in many cases in sup-
plier or customer relationships with the issuer.  These corporate holders
often belong to a formal keiretsu organization along with the issuer, amelio-
rating collective action problems.108
Large block investments imply certain governance benefits for Euro-
pean and Japanese firms.  The control shareholder monitors more closely
than do our dispersed shareholders and can intervene earlier and more
cheaply in the case of management failure.  The systems’ other primary
benefit stems from the blockholders’ ability to access information about
operations.  Reduced information asymmetries permit blockholders to in-
vest more patiently.  The longer shareholder time horizon in turn frees
management to invest for the long term and creates a more secure envi-
ronment for firm-specific investments of human capital by the firm’s
managers.109
107. See Curtis J. Milhaupt & Geoffrey P. Miller, Cooperation, Conflict, and Con-
vergence in Japanese Finance: Evidence from the “Jusen” Problem, 29 LAW & POL’Y INT’L
BUS. 1, 12-13 (1997) (describing how regulatory cartel among government and
private sector actors in Japan run according to informal norms and interlinked
decision making institutions).
108. The Japanese system also is distinguished for close ties between financial
intermediaries and government regulators. See id. at 13-14.
109. See William W. Bratton & Joseph A. McCahery, Comparative Corporate Gov-
ernance and the Theory of the Firm: The Case Against Global Cross Reference, 38 COLUM. J.
TRANSNAT’L L. 213, 224-26 (1999).
There are corresponding costs and limitations.  Where the blockholders
are firms, internal agency costs can constrain their effectiveness as
monitors.  Indeed, whatever the identity of the blockholder, its height-
ened oversight incentive does not appear in practice to result in sharp
oversight of management investment policy.  Although closer proximity
lessens the information asymmetry problem, there is an accompanying
increase in management influence and loss of critical objectivity.  Free-
dom to make long-term investments thus often means pursuit of growth
in market share at the cost of a suboptimal rate of return on equity invest-
ment.  Trading markets in blockholder countries tend to be thinner and
less transparent than in market system countries, and firms in search of
financing encounter a more restricted range of alternatives.  Meanwhile,
the blockholders themselves give up the benefits of diversification and,
given thin trading markets, liquidity and the possibility of easy exit
through sale.  Finally, there is a shortage of loyalty.  Blockholders, having
sacrificed diversification and liquidity, extract a return in the form of pri-
vate benefits yielded through self dealing or insider trading.  Legal re-
gimes in blockholder states facilitate this quid pro quo with lax protection
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These differences could lead the auditor-client relationship overseas
to have a different character than prevails in this country.  With a longer
investment time horizon prevailing and no external pressures threatening
the insiders’ control, there will be less demand for manipulation of cur-
rent numbers.  In consequence, the auditor will be freer to exercise the
judgment bound up in the application of a standard.  At the same time,
the auditor will work in closer proximity to the equity interest, with a con-
stant threat of close scrutiny.  Contrariwise, since the blockholder can get
direct access to corporate information, it will depend less on the numbers
in the audited financials.  Conservatism will loom less large as a protective
shield for small investors because small investors matter less.  Indeed, the
blockholder and the managers may share an interest in presenting self-
serving numbers to noncontrolling shareholders who buy minority stakes
in the stock market.  European lenders, meanwhile, tend to be large banks
with insider access to information rather than dispersed bondholders who
rely on published financials.  Finally, should audit failure occur, with re-
sulting injury to the blockholder, negative reputational consequences for
the auditor will loom larger.  The auditor, in effect, works for a small,
closed society of top managers, large financial institutions and wealthy in-
dividuals.  Within this corporate control club, information can be shared
quickly and easily and reputational sanctions can be meted out more effec-
tively than in a dispersed, market based system such as ours.
Given this different relational dynamic between auditor and client, a
different rulebook easily could evolve.  A blockholding system would more
easily lend itself to accounting based on principles.  But the fact that such
a principles-based system worked well in a blockholder governance system
gives us no reason to suppose that adoption of the blockholder system’s
approach would improve our system.
Sarbanes-Oxley section 108(a) follows from a cross reference hypoth-
esis.  This projects global convergence on corporate governance rules that
eliminate systemic differences and from the emergence of a hybrid best
practice.  But the projection is not safe.  Each national governance system
is a system to a significant extent.  Each system, rather than consisting of a
loose collection of separable components, is tied together by a complex
incentive structure.  Interdependencies between each system’s compo-
nents and the incentives of its actors create significant barriers to cross
reference to and from other systems.110
Sarbanes-Oxley’s convergence projection assumes divisible account-
ing institutions—a world in which one accounting system’s components
can be adapted for use in the other system without significant frictions or
perverse effects.  But to the extent that differences in stockholding pat-
of minority shareholder rights and lax securities market regulation.  This
in turn chills the development of robust trading markets.
Id. at 226-28 (footnotes omitted).
110. See id. at 258-71 (advocating for indivisible systems of corporate
governance).
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terns lead to materially different relationships between auditors and cli-
ents, there is no reason to suppose that the systems’ differing accounting
principles can be merged into a hybrid regime for effective across-the-
board application.
III. CONCLUSION
There can never be a one hundred percent directive rulebook in ac-
counting any more than there is any other regulatory context.  Nor can
slavish rule application ever be trusted to yield perfect results.  There is
always a moment of judgment.  Accordingly, GAAP of necessity always has
and always will have mixed rules and principles.  GAAP’s present rules,
applied in good faith, were more than adequate to pick up the material
misstatements in Enron’s financials.  Contrary to the accounting firms’ as-
sertions, Enron’s auditor did not proceed at the mercy of vague or inco-
herent instructions.  Contrary to former Chairman Pitt’s assertions, a
move to standards solves nothing.  Standards only work when the actor
authorized to apply them takes responsibility for exercises of judgment.
We accordingly need to keep our attention fixed on the fact that the re-
cent governance breakdowns occurred entirely on the enforcement side.
Auditors have stopped acting as neutral reviewers to take up client advo-
cacy.  Enron was an audit failure, and not a case where incomplete, inef-
fective or corrupt rules facilitated a fraud.  Under this analysis, the drafters
of Sarbanes-Oxley were right in thinking that the absence of principles has
contributed to the crisis, but wrong in diagnosing the problem as legisla-
tive.  This is not for the most part a problem concerning the relative merits
of rules and standards in the drafting of statutes.  It is instead a problem of
professional practice in a regulatory system made up of both.  It is the
auditors who need to get back to principles, taking seriously principles
already governing the reporting system.
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